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Abstract In fisheries management—as in environmental governance more generally—regulatory 
arrangements that are thought to be helpful in some contexts frequently become panaceas or, in 
other words, simple formulaic policy prescriptions believed to solve a given problem in a wide 
range of contexts, regardless of their actual consequences. When this happens, management is 
likely to fail, and negative side effects are common. We focus on the case of individual transferable 
quotas (ITQs) to explore the panacea mindset, a set of factors that promote the spread and 
persistence of panaceas. These include conceptual narratives that make easy answers like 
panaceas seem plausible, power disconnects that create vested interests in panaceas, and 
heuristics and biases that prevent people from accurately assessing panaceas. Analysts have 
suggested many approaches to avoiding panaceas, but most fail to conquer the underlying 
panacea mindset. Here, we suggest the co-development of an institutional diagnostics toolkit to 
distill the vast amount of information on fisheries governance into an easily accessible, open, on-
line database of checklists, case studies, and related resources. Toolkits like this could be used in 
many governance settings to challenge users’ understandings of a policy’s impacts and help them 
develop solutions better tailored to their particular context. They would not replace the more 
comprehensive approaches found in the literature but would rather be an intermediate step away 
from the problem of panaceas. 
Significance Statement: Using individual transferable quotas as an example, we investigate the 
panacea mindset, which includes conceptual narratives that make easy answers like panaceas 
seem plausible, power disconnects that create vested interests in panaceas, and heuristics and 
biases that prevent people from accurately assessing panaceas. We then describe a potential 
method for reducing the spread and persistence of panaceas, the institutional diagnostics toolkit, 
a simple, intuitive, and transparent tool that challenges users’ existing understandings of a policy’s 
impacts and helps them develop solutions better tailored to their particular context. Still 
imperfect, the toolkit could at least improve fit in cases where the panacea mindset is prevalent. 
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Introduction 
In environmental governance, many authors note the dangers of panaceas, or simple formulaic 
policy prescriptions that are believed to solve a given problem in a wide range of contexts, 
regardless of actual consequences (1). From this literature, we know that panaceas fail to solve 
problems and that long term adherence to panaceas can increase fragility and undermine 
resilience in socioecological systems (2–6). Still, the influence of panaceas in the thinking of both 
practitioners and analysts persists.  
In this paper, we hope to spark new research on the spread and persistence of panaceas, as well 
as strategies for avoiding them. We illustrate our points using the case of individual transferable 
quotas or ITQs (also individual fisheries quotas and individual transferable effort limits) as an 
example. Like many other types of fisheries management, ITQs start with an allowable harvest 
level or effort level set to achieve biological goals, such as maximum sustainable yield. Some 
portion of this quantity is then distributed to fishers (via individual quotas) who may trade their 
quotas in various types of markets. This transferability is the distinguishing characteristic of ITQs. 
Proponents expect that competitive quota markets will lead to outcomes that are economically 
efficient as well as sustainable in biophysical terms (7–9).  
As with many other policies that become panaceas (e.g. carbon trading, microfinance, payments 
for ecosystem services, terrestrial and marine protected areas, etc.), theory and practice diverge. 
There are many well-documented negative side effects and unintended consequences associated 
with ITQs. ITQs caused cultural upheaval through the exclusion of indigenous and subsistence 
users in the US, Canada, and New Zealand; resulted in quota oligopolies, inflexibility, and 
economic hardship in Iceland, Denmark, the UK, and the Faroe Islands; and failed to prevent stock 
declines or thwarted rebuilding efforts in several Greenlandic, Dutch, Canadian, Australian, and 
international fisheries (10–18). Even ITQ proponents agree that “getting the incentives right” as 
advocated by Lubchenco et al. (19) requires careful attention to the social, political, and 
behavioral attributes of specific cases, along with their bioeconomic features (20–22). 
Nevertheless, ITQs spread rapidly following their inception in the 1980s and they are often 
implemented without consideration of case-specific factors (14, 23–26). Widely accepted and 
applied as a panacea in fisheries governance, ITQs constitute a fitting example for this study. 
We start by describing the panacea mindset and explaining how it contributed to the 
institutionalization of ITQs as a panacea. A key insight from this analysis is that we need to 
consider cognitive and behavioral factors as well as institutions and incentives when trying to 
understand why panaceas spread and persist despite their shortcomings. This leads to some 
suggestions for moving beyond panaceas in fisheries governance through the use of institutional 
diagnostics toolkits. Continuing with our ITQ example, we show how toolkits would be user-
friendly on-line resources that allow decision makers and stakeholders to explore the costs and 
benefits of various policy options as applied to a specific context. It would not replace the more 
comprehensive approaches found in the literature. But, by counteracting some of the 
components of the panacea mindset, diagnostic toolkits would promote movement away from 
reliance on panaceas. 
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The Panacea Mindset 
If panaceas create so many problems, why do they spread and persist in so many areas of 
governance? To answer this question, we develop the concept of a panacea mindset, or suite of 
factors that predispose many decisionmakers to accept panaceas. We have identified three main 
clusters of factors in the mindset: conceptual narratives, power disconnects, and heuristics and 
biases. This list is neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive, but it combines two common themes 
in the fisheries literature (institutions and interests) with ideas from behavioral psychology 
(cognition), which are generally understudied in this context. Each cluster involves distinct causal 
mechanisms, though they often interact with one another. In this formulation, we follow Hanna 
(27), who notes that, “It is the interaction between the institutional environment, property rights 
and individual behaviors that contribute to the [governance] outcome.” Other factors may be 
important, and we hope this analysis will initiate a broader investigation into the panacea 
mindset. 
Conceptual Narratives  
People rely on narratives to understand problems and devise solutions.  Narratives may be 
detailed and complex descriptions or they may be simple metaphors or “just-so stories” that are 
intuitively appealing. Conceptual narratives are developed and spread by academics.  (28–31).  
When a conceptual narrative describes a complex problem like fisheries governance in overly 
simple ways, it paves the way for overly simple “solutions” or panaceas. Degnbol et al.  (23) show 
how conceptual narratives contribute to the use of several different panaceas in fisheries 
governance, including ITQs.  We build on their work by describing two major panacea-supporting 
conceptual narratives, though others may also be important: the neoliberal economic paradigm 
and the mainstream fisheries economics paradigm, which in turn comprises several sub-narratives 
as described below. Although both contain the term “economics,” the first is a political construct, 
while the second occurs when fisheries economics produce policy prescriptions. 
The neoliberal economic paradigm prescribes the use of incentive-based policy tools like ITQs as 
solutions in all types of environmental governance. Widely recognized in political science, this 
paradigm is a political translation—some would say corruption—of neoclassical economic theory 
(32–34). It emphasizes market forces as alternatives to government, while ignoring market 
failures, transaction costs, and most types of externalities. By seeking to remove government 
from the equation (in ITQs, mainly by letting allocation issues be handled by markets rather than 
governments), the neoliberal economic paradigm ignores the social, political, and economic 
realities that shape public policy in fisheries (15, 35–37). It is a common factor in many other 
market-based panaceas, including carbon trading, payments for ecosystem services, and 
irrigation rights (38–40) as well as corporate social responsibility and privatization of government 
services like education or prisons (41–43). 
The mainstream fisheries economics paradigm is partially embedded in the neoliberal economic 
paradigm, but it draws on a number of other sub-narratives, each of which simplifies different 
aspects of the fisheries governance problem (15, 37). First, like many renewable resources, ITQ 
fisheries are usually managed using a single stock approach, with few if any modifications for 
habitat or species interactions (44, 45). There is an extensive literature critiquing single-stock 
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management; experts recommend alternatives like multi-species, ecosystem based, and space-
based management (46–50). Nevertheless, single-stock management is the norm in large-scale 
commercial fisheries, and it is a fundamental conceptual narrative supporting ITQs (25, 45, 51).  
This narrative oversimplifies actual cases in two main ways. First, as in neoclassical economics 
more broadly, when mainstream fisheries economists prescribe policy, there is a tendency toward 
Whitehead’s “fallacy of misplaced concreteness.” (52, 53). In other words, while fisheries 
economists tend to recognize the many limitations of their models in scholarly work, these 
caveats are often missing or downplayed in their policy prescriptions (see e.g. , 7, 54).  Second, 
mainstream fisheries economists focus on open access to the exclusion of other market failures. 
This is due in part to treatment of the tragedy of the commons (55) as a problem of market failure 
arising from a lack of private property rights (56–59). Ironically, these authors then go on to ignore 
or downplay the market failures associated with ITQs, including reduced competition and 
increased inefficiencies from the consolidation of quota ownership (more below) (26, 60–62).  
Mainstream fisheries narratives also oversimplify fisheries governance by removing politics and 
institutions from the equation. There is a vast literature on the management of the commons 
documenting alternatives to property rights that ensure sustainable use of fisheries and other  
natural resources (63–70). Conversely, ITQs often create interest groups that use the system for 
their own ends (see next section). This is why some authors advocate incorporating human rights 
in the concept of rights based management, moving from the overly simple option of ITQs to a 
wider range of solutions that could be tailored to fit the needs and interests of local communities 
(71, 72) and society at large (73). 
Power Disconnects  
Like most other forms of management, ITQs create winners and losers. In the process, they can 
widen power disconnects, which arise when those who benefit from a governance system have 
greater political and economic power than those who are harmed by it (74). Power disconnects 
contribute to the panacea mindset by providing beneficiaries with the influence to ensure that 
such measures are adopted and remain in place. In fisheries, this allows influential fishers to limit 
competition via governance systems (27, 75). It is a direct contravention of the theoretical logic 
of ITQs and ensures that any potential benefits in the form of increased efficiency through 
competition may be lost due to a combination of monopsony power in the market for quota and 
capture of political rents from the ITQ system (76–82). Furthermore, by “locking-in” overly simple 
ITQs via regulatory capture, power disconnects reduce flexibility in the long-run, thereby 
increasing systemic vulnerability (45, 83, 84).  
As noted by Lasswell (85) and others, government capture like that associated with ITQs is 
common; in the context of fisheries governance it can cause serious ecological, financial, and 
political instabilities. There are two sides to this issue. With high capital reserves and interests in 
multiple fisheries (or other industries), elites who monopolize quota are insulated from both 
economic and ecological costs in any given fishery. This encourages them to downplay risks faced 
by local fishing communities, and it may negate expected benefits from ITQs, such as longer time 
horizons, greater stewardship of the resource, and improved efficiency through competition (14, 
80, 86).  
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Conversely, when inhabitants of fishing communities who experience the costs of overly simple 
ITQs have little political power, decisionmakers will have few incentives to respond to their 
concerns. This is not just an issue of social justice. Because of their dependence on local resources, 
these communities have greater incentives to protect the local ecosystem (18, 63, 84, 87–90). 
This does not guarantee that fishing communities will not embrace panaceas, including ITQs, but 
they will experience the costs of the panacea sooner and more extensively, giving them incentives 
to find policy options with fewer negative side effects. The combined effects of these factors are 
apparent in the Icelandic fishery described below but have also been documented in the Faroe 
Islands, Greenland, Denmark, Norway, the UK, Peru and other fisheries where quota consolidation 
is permitted or where coastal communities are otherwise excluded (51, 73, 87, 91). 
Evidence for the social costs of power disconnects associated with ITQs is extensive, but 
bioeconomic benefits have also been diluted as powerful quota-holders lobby to raise catch limits 
above scientifically recommended levels in order to maintain the “value” of their quota (18, 92–
94). Ecologically, locked-in ITQs are ill-suited to handling the non-linearities and interconnections 
occurring in dynamic marine systems. It is always easier to raise the total allowable harvests in 
good years and harder to lower them in bad years. But when powerful groups of “owners” treat 
shares as assets, it can be nearly impossible to achieve the needed flexibility (78, 91, 93, 95, 96). 
Macroeconomic instabilities also have been observed in cases where fisheries rights are used as 
financial instruments in fisheries-dependent countries. In Iceland, for example, the creation of 
financial instruments based to a considerable extent on catch shares played a role in the collapse 
of the country’s major financial institutions in 2008, producing a deep crisis with significant 
negative impacts on the welfare of the entire Icelandic public (11, 97, 98). Here again, if those 
with power felt the effects of their actions sooner and more clearly, modifications might have 
been made to prevent these types of risks. This is another way power disconnects reinforce 
panaceas and other sub-optimal policy choices. 
Heuristics and Biases  
Human cognition and behavior contribute to the appeal of panaceas. People tend to rely on 
heuristics when faced with complex problems involving high costs of information or other 
transaction costs. Often, these mental shortcuts make decisions easier, but they can also create 
biases that degrade decisionmaking  (99–103). Biases may also arise as people try to rationalize 
bad behavior and reduce cognitive dissonance or reflect prejudicial social norms (104–106).  
These factors are largely ignored in the literature on ITQs and, more generally, in the neoliberal 
problem narrative, because people are assumed to be perfectly rational. Indeed, implementation 
of ITQs is often referred to as the “rationalization” of a fishery. However, psychologists have 
demonstrated that humans are predictably irrational. This is not to say that all individuals always 
behave irrationally, but rather that for a given choice point, a percentage of the population will 
use simplifying heuristics and biases that skew their choices in predictable ways (107–111).  
Many well-known heuristics and biases contribute to the institutionalization of ITQs and other 
panaceas.  We do not have space for a full review here but provide a few examples to show the 
rich potential for future study in this area. Several heuristics encourage the spread of panaceas 
by biasing decisionmakers toward policies that appear to work in one set of circumstances, even 
if both the context and the actual content of the regulatory regime differ substantially. For 
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instance, the representativeness heuristic is based on the assumption that a small sample is 
representative of the entire population and, furthermore, that the population resembles the most 
salient aspects of the sample (112). Based on a handful of perceived successes in places like 
Iceland the 1980s, decisionmakers who rely on the representativeness heuristic would assume 
that ITQs could work in many other contexts, regardless of actual fit. Similarly, the halo effect 
occurs when the perceived “goodness” or “badness” of a person or thing biases judgment in its 
favor. The implication here is that, if people believe that ITQs are “good,” they will judge the 
effects much more positively than if they believe that ITQs are “bad,” dismissing negative side 
effects caused by a poor fit (113).  
Other cognitive factors well-studied in psychology but not in environmental governance can 
obscure the potential costs and benefits of using panaceas like ITQs. People are not good at 
assessing risk in complex systems. Even when presented with detailed estimates of objective 
environmental risk, many people assess risks based on other information like the ease with which 
they can recall an event happening before (i.e., the availability heuristic) or their gut response to 
the event (i.e., the affect heuristic) (114–117). Difficulties assessing risk also arise from 
innumeracy, or people’s inability to internalize the numerical representations of risk most 
commonly used in science (118–120). There is little research on the perception of risk in fisheries 
governance. But in Alaska and elsewhere, the risk of fishery collapse or failure in the absence of 
ITQs is often overstated, leading to a false dichotomy; the only two options considered are 
collapse (due to the tragedy of the commons) or rebuilding and return to profitability through 
ITQs (121, 122). The many other policy options available are ignored.  
Some heuristics also reinforce other components of the panacea mindset. The halo effect can 
amplify the influence of conceptual narratives, as people who already believe that ITQs will work 
are more likely to judge them as effective (123). Confirmation bias works in a similar way, ensuring 
that people accept information that confirms their prior beliefs while disregarding information 
that contradicts those beliefs, regardless of its veracity in either case. This bias can also contribute 
to the persistence of panaceas in spite of evidence regarding ineffectiveness or negative side 
effect as well-documented in the literature (124, 125). Groupthink and group polarization are also 
important. Groupthink occurs when social networks reinforce prior beliefs, often by allowing 
group members to discard any information that contradicts preferred conceptual narratives (126–
128). Similarly, as people with moderate positions on a given topic talk to each other, their 
positions often become more extreme. This is known as group polarization (129, 130). As seen in 
recent studies, these processes can reinforce prejudices and power disconnects as well (131–133).  
Other cognitive biases can reinforce power disconnects in the panacea mindset. Experimental and 
observational evidence shows that people with power over others are more likely than the 
average person to forget facts or events that make their goals seem less worthy or less achievable 
and to reject evidence disconfirming the effectiveness of their preferred policies (134–137). They 
screen out knowledge of competing goals, negative impacts, and other information that would 
make panaceas less palatable.  In addition, those in power frequently rationalize the external 
costs of panaceas by blaming scapegoats. Abstract concepts like “complexity” or non-human 
agents (e.g. bats, mice, etc.) may be implicated, but when groups of people are targeted, power 
disconnects widen considerably (138–140). Marginalized groups may be dehumanized based on 
social biases that are either explicit (stereotyping, prejudice) or implicit (in-group bias, out-group 
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attribution error). As problems and related costs increase, the resulting network effects and cycles 
of rationalization can lead to high levels of environmental injustice that increase the fragility of 
the system (141–144).   
While more research is needed, there is some evidence that elites with vested interests in ITQs 
rationalize1 negative side effects imposed on others (e.g. keeping them out of the fishery or 
forcing them to accept low prices for their catch in exchange for access to shares) so that they can 
continue to enjoy asymmetric benefits (15, 87, 145, 146). Of particular concern here is the 
tendency for ITQs to exclude indigenous peoples or those who are otherwise marginalized 
politically and economically due to structural factors such as racism. There is clear evidence of 
this occurring in fisheries in New Zealand, Alaska, and several other countries (147, 148). ITQ 
proponents rationalize such effects by emphasizing efficiency and expected improvements in the 
health of fish stocks that will “lift all boats,” reducing social justice problems by providing 
alternative sources of livelihood (12, 13, 21). As in other domains, this logic ignores the loss of 
cultural practices and traditional ecological knowledge, as well as the ways in which power 
disconnects can prevent the “trickle down” of benefits to marginalized groups. There is ample 
evidence that ITQs can destroy cultural values and exacerbate economic inequalities, particularly 
when power disconnects are reinforced by social-psychological rationalizations (14, 45, 149–151).  
An Institutional Diagnostics Toolkit 
Although the elements of the panacea mindset are widespread, there are many experts who 
embrace the complexities of environmental governance. They have designed more 
comprehensive approaches meant to guide decisionmakers as they fit policies to dynamic 
environmental, political, and economic conditions. Ecosystem based management, space based 
management, adaptive management, co-management, and various combinations of these 
approaches are much discussed and have substantially improved environmental governance in 
areas including forestry, water, climate change, biodiversity, and, of course, fisheries (6, 152–
156). Unfortunately, where the panacea mindset is affecting governance choices these more 
comprehensive and seemingly more complex approaches are not likely to be selected or, if they 
are put in place, implementation will be incomplete. In addition, there is the possibility that 
stakeholder engagement, polycentricity, and other key elements of adaptive co-management are 
now being treated as panaceas, with highly appealing just-so stories taking the place of nuanced 
empirical analyses (157, 158).   
Combating conceptual narratives, reducing power disconnects, and minimizing the influence of 
simple heuristics and biases is a difficult task. We cannot vanquish the panacea mindset in a few 
paragraphs. In any case, this is not a task for a small group, but rather for society as a whole.  
Nevertheless, as a practical mid-range approach, we suggest the use of institutional diagnostic 
toolkits that could help people avoid panaceas in different issue areas. Based in the literature on 
institutional diagnostics (2, 4, 159, 160), toolkits would not replace existing comprehensive 
approaches, but would be complementary and could be used in situations where the panacea 
                                                          
1 Not to be confused with the rationalization of effort, or really the reduction of effort to more efficient 
levels, which is an intended consequence of ITQs. 
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mindset is limiting governance options. A well-designed toolkit may even guide users to more 
comprehensive methods.  
For any given management challenge, the creation of a toolkit would start with transdisciplinary 
working groups that bring together academics, decisionmakers, and stakeholders to develop a set 
of institutional diagnostic checklists that capitalize on the wealth of knowledge on environmental 
governance to make it easier to determine the fit of a set of policies to a specific context. These 
groups would also develop corresponding case narratives that go beyond just-so stories to 
highlight the importance of considering context. Hopefully, this process itself would ameliorate 
the conceptual narrative portion of the panacea mindset by breaking through groupthink, though 
this will depend on the willingness of participants to step out of their ideological boxes.  
Table 1 provides an example of the types of items that could go into a diagnostic checklist for 
ITQs, which in turn would be part of a larger fisheries governance toolkit. It is organized around 
five key governance goals identified in the literature. Because of space limitations we can only 
include one or two rows per goal, each drawn from our description of the panacea mindset above, 
but this should show how such a checklist might work. Associated system properties or diagnostic 
conditions under each goal are listed in column 1, with indications of the fit of ITQs to that 
property in column 2, followed by methods to improve fit or select alternatives that would be a 
better fit in column 3. The purpose here is to expand the users’ conception of the problem 
(preferably beyond their own conceptual narratives), help them think about how the policy might 
fit their context (e.g. whether fit is conditional on the use of additional policies or requires the 
prevention/removal of the property associated with the diagnostic condition), and provide new 
ideas about potential solutions.  
TABLE 1 DIAGNOSTIC CONSIDERATIONS RELEVANT TO ITQS IN INDUSTRIALIZED FISHERIES 
 
Diagnostic 
Condition 
ITQs Fit? Design Elements to Improve Fit/Alternative Solutions 
Ecological 
Overfishing of a 
single stock 
Conditional Binding, science-based total allowable catch (TAC), sufficient 
monitoring and enforcement; size limits and other measures 
may be needed as well 
Case Studies: Pacific Halibut, Peruvian Anchoveta  
Primary Sources: (161–163), (164–166) 
Ecological 
interactions 
Conditional TACs established using ecosystem-based or multispecies 
management; marine protected areas, space-based 
management used to protect critical habitats; multi-species 
quotas [see also Governance, System-level Resilience] 
Case Studies: Icelandic Herring, Norwegian Cod 
Primary Sources: (167–169), (73, 170, 171) 
Economic  
Overcapitalization  Conditional Binding, science-based TAC, sufficient monitoring and 
enforcement [See also Sociocultural]. Alternatives: Individual 
quotas (IQs), community based management (CBM), traditional 
use rights fisheries (TURFs) [a list of other options can be found 
here]  
Case Studies: Pacific Halibut, Alaska Salmon 
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Primary Sources: (161–163), (172–174) 
Oligopolistic 
control of quota 
No, unless 
oligopoly is 
eliminated 
Remove/prevent oligopoly via: limits on quota holdings, and 
programs to provide access to specific groups (e.g. young 
fishers, community members) 
Alternatives: IQs, CBM, TURFs 
Case Studies: Icelandic Herring, Faroe Islands Mixed Fishery 
Primary Sources: (167–169), (51, 175, 176) 
Sociocultural 
Structural 
injustice 
No, unless 
rights are 
protected 
Establish management rights to give voice to groups most 
affected, institute co-management and/or stakeholder 
engagement 
Alternatives: IQs, CBM, TURFs 
Case Studies: Alaska Salmon, New Zealand ITQs 
Primary Sources: (172–174), (150, 151, 177) 
Coastal 
communities' 
livelihoods 
No, unless 
livelihoods are 
protected 
Protect livelihoods by establishing management rights to give 
voice to groups most affected, institute co-management and/or 
stakeholder engagement 
Alternatives: IQs, CBM, TURFs 
Case Studies: Icelandic Groundfish, Alaska Salmon, New 
Zealand ITQs 
Primary Sources: (98, 178, 179), (172–174), (150, 151, 177) 
Governance 
Power 
disconnects 
No, because of 
potential for 
lock-in 
Reduce disconnects by establishing management rights to give 
voice to groups most affected, institute co-management and/or 
stakeholder engagement; Alternatives: IQs, CBM, TURFs 
Case Studies: Faroe Islands Mixed Fishery, Alaska Salmon 
Sources: (51, 175, 176), (172–174) 
Corruption/ 
government 
capture 
No, because of 
power 
disconnects 
and lock-in 
To minimize political rents: Allocation via auction, limits on 
portion of quota owned by an individual or corporation, 
temporary rights rather than property rights; To reduce 
government capture: incorporate management rights for all 
stakeholders, institute co-management and/or stakeholder 
engagement; Alternatives: IQs, CBM, TURFs 
Case Studies: Faroe Islands Mixed Fishery, Peruvian Anchoveta, 
Icelandic Groundfish 
Sources: (51, 175, 176), (164–166), (98, 178, 179) 
 System-level Resilience* 
Sudden or 
surprising 
changes  
No, because of 
lock-in 
To avoid lock-in: see advice on Oligopoly, Power Disconnects, 
and Corruption. Alternatives: adaptive management, EBM, 
SBM, CBM, TURFs 
Case Studies: Icelandic Groundfish, Peruvian Anchoveta, 
Norwegian Cod 
Sources: (98, 178, 179), (164–166), (73, 170, 171) 
* These may be ecological, financial, political, social, etc.  
Of course, the short descriptions given in Column 3 are insufficient to guide decisionmakers fully. 
In the real version of the checklist, this information would be more extensive. But we also envision 
that the full toolkit would augment each checklist by providing hyperlinks to additional 
information (indicated by blue, underlined text in the table). Design elements are linked to 
detailed descriptions of best practices for suggested modifications of a basic ITQ policy. 
Alternatives provide links to checklists for policies that could be used instead of ITQs. Links to case 
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studies give users concrete examples of the diversity of costs and benefits associated with 
implementing ITQs under each condition. Like the checklist, these cases would be compiled by a 
group of experts and would be written to provide accessible narratives that illustrate points in the 
checklist. We would also include links to the peer-reviewed journal articles that were used as 
sources for the cases. Here, we provide a few sources for each case (see reference list for details) 
but ultimately a larger library could be integrated into the toolkit. There is considerable overlap 
of conditions within cases, so most are used more than once. This demonstrates the complexity 
of fisheries governance and the need to pay attention to multiple factors. 
To shift from an ITQ checklist to a fisheries governance toolkit, all of these elements would be 
connected via a relational database (or a set of linked data tables) that is searchable via a user-
friendly interface. For ITQs, the database would allow a user who is interested in designing an ITQ 
system to search on any variation on the term ITQ and come up with the appropriate checklist. 
Alternatively, a user could enter a given policy goal and get a set of checklists associated with the 
various options that could be used to achieve that goal. Another possibility would be to search for 
case studies based on geography, time, or species, and then follow hyperlinks to the policies or 
checklists associated with those search results. In fact, a user could search on a component in any 
one of the data tables in the toolkit to find related information from any of the other tables. 
Hyperlinks, menus, and other tools would allow users to explore the database in an intuitive 
fashion.   
Of course, a toolkit like this could be abused by decisionmakers and vested interests seeking to 
justify panaceas that benefit them, just as any other policy approach can be. This is what makes 
the transparent and on-line nature of the system so important. Stakeholders and the public can 
use the toolkit to assess existing policies, to develop scientifically-grounded options that better 
fit their interests, and, ultimately, to hold decisionmakers accountable.  
As a public good, the most likely roadblock to the development and implementation of toolkits 
like this is lack of resources. However, there is precedent for such investment. In fisheries alone, 
there are several global-scale databases, most notably those managed by the UN Food and 
Agriculture Organization and the Fishbase system. Neither database covers governance factors 
beyond biophysical and economic data, but such information is included in the more general 
Social Ecological Systems Meta-Analysis Database (180) and the International Environmental 
Agreements Database (181). These successful efforts suggest that toolkits could be created for 
fisheries or other issue areas, though each would likely have to start small and be built over 
time, much like Wikipedia or other open-source, on-line megaprojects. We also note that 
crowd-sourcing information among experts is increasing and technological costs are declining, 
and so if the will exists, the way is already available.  
Conclusion  
We use ITQs as an example to show how the three components of the panacea mindset help 
institutionalize panaceas despite negative bioeconomic and sociocultural side effects. Conceptual 
narratives like the neoliberal economic paradigm popularize overly simple depictions of the 
governance problem, making it more plausible that solutions could come in a one-size-fits-all 
form. Power disconnects give vested interests the influence they need to create and maintain 
panaceas despite unequal costs and benefits. Heuristics and biases make it difficult for people to 
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assess the effects of panaceas, increasing the likelihood that their lack of fit will favor adoption 
and prevent removal. 
Overcoming panaceas in environmental governance is a challenge that extends well beyond the 
debate about the pros and cons of arrangements featuring ITQs. The same mindset that led to 
the spread and persistence of ITQs as a panacea can undermine other regulatory tools as well, 
creating major weaknesses at a time when ecosystems and communities are already highly 
stressed by multiple forces including resource depletion, pollution, development, and climate 
change. As scientists, we need to enhance understanding of the factors that contribute to the 
spread and persistence of panaceas in order to combat them. This effort has its own intellectual 
merits and can also provide better governance not just in fisheries but also in many other issue 
areas where panaceas are prevalent. In our view, “going beyond panaceas” will require grappling 
with the panacea mindset (2). This knowledge should then be used to develop mid-range theories 
and intermediate resources like institutional diagnostics toolkits that make it easier to design 
context-appropriate institutions that are better than panaceas. 
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